2007 JUN -8 PM 1: 03 ENVIR. APPEALS BOARD

BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C.

FIFRA Appeal No. 07-(02)

In The Matter Of:

Rizing Sun, L.L.C. Peoria, Arizona

Docket No. FIFRA-9-2004-0024 (Region IX)

Appeal from the Initial Decision of the Presiding Officer, Administrative Law Judge Spencer T. Nissen, Dated May 8, 2007

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Associate Director for Agriculture of the Communities and Ecosystems Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX (the "Appellant"), files this brief in support of its Notice of Appeal filed concurrently pursuant to section 22.30(a) of the Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties and the Revocation/Termination or Suspension of Permits ("Consolidated Rules of Practice"), 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(a). Appellant is seeking review of the Initial Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Spencer T. Nissen (the "ALJ"), dated May 8, 2007, in In the Matter of Rizing Sun, L.L.C., Docket No. FIFRA-9-2004-0024. Appellant respectfully requests that the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB" or the "Board") vacate, in a published order, a single portion of the ALJ's Initial Decision.

## II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED

This brief presents one issue for resolution by the Board on appeal:

Whether EPA can assess separate civil penalties for violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) arising from the distribution or sale of the same pesticide in the same transaction.

Appellant contends that the ALJ committed a clear error of law in determining that Appellant cannot assess separate penalties for violations of section 12(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA" or the "Act"), 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(A), and section 12(a)(1)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E), arising from the distribution or sale of the same pesticide in the same transaction, and respectfully requests that the Board vacate this portion of his

Initial Decision. Since the penalty that the ALJ assessed in the Initial Decision is based on Respondent's limited ability to pay, Appellant does not seek to have the Board remand this matter for assessment of a different penalty amount or assess an alternative penalty amount pursuant to its *de novo* authority under 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f). The sole focus of this brief is construction of FIFRA section 12 and the assessability of separate penalties for violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) arising from a single transaction.

# III. STANDARD APPLICABLE TO THE BOARD'S REVIEW OF INITIAL DECISIONS

The Consolidated Rules of Practice provide that the Board, when ruling on an appeal,

shall adopt, modify, or set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law or discretion contained in the decision or order being reviewed. . . .

40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f).

In <u>Rhee Bros., Inc.</u>, 13 E.A.D. \_ (May 17, 2007), slip. op. at 12, the EAB expressed reluctance, absent a compelling rationale, to issue advisory opinions or parse the language of an initial decision in matters where the amount of the penalty is not at issue. While cognizant of this reluctance, Appellant respectfully asserts that review is warranted in this case. In <u>Hall Signs</u>, EPCRA Appeal No. 97-6 (EAB Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished Final Order), the Board noted that "[d]espite our general reluctance to be drawn

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Further, in this matter, the penalty was substantially reduced only for the ability to pay factor. <u>See</u> page 5 <u>infra</u>. Appellant thinks it proper to take such factors into account while still having the opportunity to request review of legal issues.

into such cases [i.e., cases where the amount of the penalty is not at issue], we think the issue raised by the Region's appeal may be dealt with in short order, and for that reason alone we have decided to address it." Slip. op. at 8.

Where <u>Rhee</u> focused on numerous alleged deficiencies in the ALJ's application of EPA's FIFRA Enforcement Response Policy ("ERP") to the violations at issue, this appeal focuses solely on a discrete issue of law: whether FIFRA permits EPA to assess separate penalties for violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) arising from the same transaction. Appellant asserts that this single narrow legal issue "may be dealt with in short order" without regard to the specific facts of this case, and requires little or no parsing of the language of the initial decision. Moreover, although <u>Rhee</u> affirmed that "an ALJ's initial decision in a particular matter does not establish binding precedent for future cases," slip. op. at 13, fn. 14, Appellant urges the Board to review this matter "to assure that the initial decision does not establish an erroneous precedent." <u>In re Martin Electronics</u>, Inc., 2 E.A.D. 381, 385 (CJO 1987).

Finally, we note that, unlike the <u>Cavenham Forest</u> and <u>Simpson Paper EAB permit decisions cited by the Board in <u>Rhee</u>, slip. op. at 12, this matter does not involve speculative or hypothetical concerns. The ALJ's erroneous legal conclusion concerning the assessability of separate penalties for FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(A)(1)(E) violations establishes a tangible and present compliance disincentive for the regulated community by encouraging violators of one part of FIFRA section 12(a) to violate additional</u>

parts of FIFRA section 12(a) without penalty. For all of the above reasons, Appellant believes that there is a compelling rationale for the Board to reverse the ALJ's finding that separate penalties cannot be assessed for violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) arising from the same transaction.

## IV. BACKGROUND

#### A. Facts

Rizing Sun, L.L.C. ("Respondent" or "Appellee") is a Nevada corporation that is owned and operated by Mr. Allen H. Smith of Peoria, Arizona. Since 2003, Respondent has engaged in wholesale distribution or sale of various pet flea and tick products to pet shops throughout the United States.<sup>2</sup> Several inspections established that Respondent distributed or sold 14 different types of "Frontline" brand of pet flea and tick products in 31 separate transactions in 2003 and 2004.

EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs ("OPP") examined the labeling and packaging of the samples collected during the inspections and concluded that all the samples of "Frontline" pet flea and tick products obtained during these inspections were not "registered" and were "misbranded" within the meaning of FIFRA. (Compl.Ex. 11 at 1-3; 12 at 1-4).

#### B. Procedural History

On September 28, 2004, Appellant filed an administrative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Appellant does not appeal any of the findings of fact in the Initial Decision. Because this appeal is of a single legal issue, the facts presented here are limited to those which place the appeal in context. The Initial Decision provides a full recitation of the facts in this matter. Initial Decision at 6-18.

complaint against Respondent alleging 31 counts of distribution or sale of unregistered pesticides in violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 31 counts of distribution or sale of misbranded pesticides in violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E). Appellant subsequently proposed a \$214,200 penalty for these violations.

On November 4, 2005, Appellant filed a motion for accelerated decision as to liability in this matter. On February 1, 2006, the ALJ granted, in part, Appellant's motion, finding Respondent liable for 31 counts of distribution or sale of misbranded pesticides in violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E).

The ALJ held a hearing on February 7, 2006. On May 8, 2007, the ALJ issued his Initial Decision, in which he found Respondent liable for the 31 violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and the 31 violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E). However, the ALJ determined that the non-registration and misbranding violations are dependent violations and thus a penalty could only be assessed for either distribution or sale of an unregistered pesticide or distribution or sale of a misbranded pesticide. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that the appropriate penalty, before consideration of Respondent's ability to pay, was \$107,100 - half of the original proposed penalty. Initial Decision at 27. However, based on Respondent's ability to pay, the ALJ assessed a civil penalty of \$10,000.

#### V. ARGUMENT

A. FIFRA Provides for Assessment of Separate Civil Penalties for Violations of FIFRA Section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) Arising From a Single Distribution or Sale of a Same Pesticide.

The statutory language and legislative history of FIFRA, as well as the regulatory framework of the Act, and case law all demonstrate that a single act of distribution or sale of a pesticide can violate both section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(A), 136j(a)(1)(E), and subject the violator to separate penalties for each violation.

In the Initial Decision, the ALJ erroneously concluded that the unit of violation for a distribution or sale of a pesticide where the individual violations set forth at FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) (unregistered pesticides) and FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E) (misbranded pesticides) both accrued is the distribution or sale giving rise to a single assessable violation and that despite the distribution or sale being unlawful for both reasons, the number of distributions or sales is the only basis for assessing a penalty.<sup>3</sup> The ALJ thereby ignores the separate and distinct elements of liability; Appellant must demonstrate that the pesticide is unregistered under FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and misbranded under FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E) - distribution or sale alone is not enough. The ALJ demotes these required elements of liability into mere reasons why a distribution or sale is unlawful. Accordingly,

 $<sup>^3</sup>$  Initial Decision at 24. <u>See also</u> the Order at 18. The ALJ correctly concluded that the pesticides at issue were both unregistered and misbranded in violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E). Initial Decision at 22-23.

he erroneously determined that Appellant cannot assess a penalty for both distribution or sale of an unregistered pesticide and distribution or sale of a misbranded pesticide for a single distribution or sale of a pesticide. The Initial Decision at 24. See also the Order at 18-19.

The statutory language of FIFRA is clear that a violation of section 12(a)(1)(A) is not dependent upon a violation of section 12(a)(1)(E) and vice versa. Specifically, FIFRA section 12(a)(1) states in relevant part:

- (A) any pesticide that is not registered under section 3 or whose registration has been canceled or suspended;
- (B) any registered pesticide if any claims made for it as a part of its distribution or sale substantially differ from any claims made for it as a part of the statement required in connection with its registration under section 3;
- (E) any pesticide which is adulterated or misbranded. .
- 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1) (emphasis added).

At the outset, it is important to note that the violations for non-registration and misbranding protect separate interests. The registration process provides EPA the opportunity to evaluate the risks and benefits of a pesticide prior to marketing. Misbranding requires that all pesticides have correct labeling. The two violations can occur simultaneously or singularly.

Under FIFRA section 12(a)(1), a violation of section 12(a)(1)(A) and a violation of section 12(a)(1)(B) are mutually

exclusive. A single distribution or sale cannot give rise to violation of both provisions. Either one sold an unregistered pesticide or one sold a registered pesticide with claims that differ from those approved for registration. Conversely, a violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and a violation of section 12(a)(1)(E) are not mutually exclusive. Both subsections apply to "any pesticide." If Congress had intended that an "unregistered" pesticide cannot be assessed a separate penalty as a "misbranded" pesticide, it would have drafted section 12(a)(1)(E) to apply to only a "registered pesticide," like section 12(a)(1)(B). It did not do so.

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The ALJ's construction of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) violates one of the most basic canons of statutory construction - it essentially nullifies the effect of section 12(a)(1)(E) for unregistered pesticides. The linchpin of the ALJ's argument is the incorrect assertion that the six separate subprovisions of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) form a single provision of Initial Decision at 23-25 and fn. 30. That construction would then suggest that the 18 separate wide-ranging subprovisions of FIFRA section 12(a)(2) also form a single provision of law. Such a construction of either provision is nonsensical. section 12(a)(1) and (2) are each lists of individual violations with each subprovision of the list constituting a separate violation of law. For example, FIFRA section 12(a)(2)(B) has three subprovisions (prepare, maintain or submit records; submit reports; and allow entry or inspection), each of which is substantively discrete and a separately cognizable violation. The ALJ's parsing of the statute would not only conglomerate the three subprovisions of FIFRA section 12(a)(2)(B), but all the subprovisions of FIFRA section 12(a)(2) as well. Thus, the plain language of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) allows a single distribution or sale of a pesticide to trigger two independently assessable violations of both section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E).

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In concluding that "the distribution or sale of a pesticide" is the triggering act for a violation of any or all of the provisions of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) and that the statute provides for only a single penalty for a single act of distribution or sale, the ALJ relied on "the fact that the conjunctive 'or' separates the cited listing of unlawful acts in FIFRA § 12(a)(1)." The Initial Decision at 24. This misreads the grammar of the statute. FIFRA section 12(a)(1) uses the conjunctive 'or' to conclude the list of distinct and independent violations, as discussed above, and to distinguish between violations pertaining to pesticides, set forth at section 12(a)(1)(A) through 12(a)(1)(E), and violations pertaining to "devices," set forth at section 12(a)(1)(F). Pesticides and devices are mutually exclusive; a product must be one or the other.

The ALJ also relies on EPA's FIFRA ERP, "which provides that dependent violations may be listed in the complaint, but will not result in separate civil penalties." Initial Decision at 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>FIFRA section 2(h) defines the term "device" as "any instrument or contrivance . . . which is intended for trapping, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest." 7 U.S.C. § 136(h). FIFRA section 2(u) defines the term "pesticide" as "any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u).

However, this reliance is misplaced. In fact, the ERP directly supports assessability of separate penalties for violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) arising from a single transaction. The ERP provides:

A separate civil penalty . . . shall be assessed for each independent violation of the Act. A violation is independent if it results from an act (or failure to act) which is not the result of any other charge for which a civil penalty is to be assessed, or if the elements of proof for the violations are different.

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ERP at 25. In this case, pesticides are misbranded because of facts other than the lack of registration and the lack of registration does not result from the misbranding. Moreover, with the exception of distribution or sale, the elements of proof with respect to FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) are completely different. FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) requires a showing of the distribution or sale of a pesticide that is not registered under FIFRA section 3, while FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E) requires a showing of the distribution or sale of a pesticide that is misbranded for labeling or packaging deficiencies, including labeling bearing incorrect registration or establishment numbers, inadequate directions for use or false or misleading statements. See FIFRA S 2(q), 7 U.S.C. § 136(q). The ERP is clear that multiple penalties can be assessed for independent violations.5

In <u>Blockburger v. U.S.</u>, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court devised a test for determining whether there are two offenses, or

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The ERP does limit the assessment of penalties for dependent violations, such as multiple types of misbranding on a single product label, but that is clearly not the case with the violations at issue here. ERP at 26.

only one, in cases where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions. The Court declared:

The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is, whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.

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Id. at 304. See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Applying this test, the Court held that a sale of morphine hydrochloride to a purchaser violated two separate provisions of the Narcotic Act and upheld the prison sentence and fine assessed for each violation. Id. at 304-305.

While this test was first devised in the context of a criminal proceeding, the <u>Blockburger</u> test is applicable to civil proceedings as well.<sup>6</sup> Applying <u>Blockburger</u> to a claim under FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and a claim under FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E), it is clear each provision requires proof of elements which the other does not. Consequently, assessment of a penalty recognizing violation of each provision is appropriate in general, and in this case. By way of analogy, a person driving recklessly with a suspended license is not penalized only for one violation because a single act of driving triggers both violations. Because each violation requires proof of elements that the other does not, each violation warrants separate penalties. It should be no different

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>See <u>Lovgren v. Byrne</u>, 787 F.2d 857 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1986). Since criminal matters involving potential loss of liberty typically yield more narrow rulings, the <u>Blockburger</u> test is merely the floor for civil judicial and civil administrative matters.

with FIFRA section 12(a)(1).

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Additionally, the legislative history of FIFRA supports assessment of separate penalties for any distribution or sale of a pesticide violative of both FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) 12(a)(1)(E). Misbranding is a violation that is associated with pesticide labeling. <u>See</u> FIFRA § 2(q), 7 U.S.C. § 136(q). labeling requirements associated with FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E) originate from the Insecticide Act of 1910, formerly 7 U.S.C. § 121 et seq. (1910), which predates FIFRA and established labeling requirements for insecticides, fungicides, and lead arsenate only. See Insecticide Act, Pub. L. No. 61-152, 36 Stat. 331 (1910). This act also imposed penalties of up to \$200 for the first violation and up to \$300 and/or imprisonment of up to one year for any subsequent violations of the labeling requirements. Id. FIFRA was later enacted in 1947, it subsumed and broadened the labeling requirements of the Insecticide Act, separately created the pesticide registration scheme, and introduced section 14 that provided that "[a]ny registrant, commercial applicator, wholesaler, dealer, retailer, or other distributor who violates any provision of this  $\operatorname{Act}$  may be assessed a civil penalty . . . of not more than \$5,000 for each offense." There is nothing in the legislative history that suggests that Congress intended that EPA cannot assess a separate penalty for a single transaction that violates the misbranding and the lack of registration provisions. 14(a)(1) of FIFRA which addresses assessment of civil penalties for all violations of the Act does not expressly limit recovery for

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$ 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1) (emphasis added).

multiple violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) nor does the ALJ point to any such language.

Several prior initial decisions have considered this question and found these violations to be independently assessable. re Avril, Inc., Docket No. I.F. & R. III-441-C (ALJ March 24, 1997), EPA initiated an enforcement action against a chemical blender that sent 22 separate shipments of a cleaning agent to a customer in 1989 and 1990. This product was not registered with EPA and was misbranded, lacking a complete list of active and inactive ingredients as well as the producer's establishment The presiding officer held that each shipment violated both FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E); "The violations of selling an unregistered pesticide and of selling a pesticide that is misbranded are not dependent on each other and may properly be charged separately for each shipment." Id. at 18. See also Aquarium Products, Inc., Docket No. I.F. & R. I11-439-C, 1995 EPA ALJ LEXIS 87 (ALJ June 30, 1995); Rek Chem Manufacturing Corp., Docket No. I.F. & R. VI-437C, 1993 WL 256445, EPA (ALJ May 10, 1993).8

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<sup>\*</sup>While choosing not to follow the <u>Avril</u>, <u>Aquarium Products</u>, and <u>Rek Chem</u> decisions, the ALJ cites <u>FRM Chem</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, <u>a/k/a Industrial Specialties</u>, FIFRA Appeal No. 05-01, 2006 EPA App. LEXIS 28 (EAB June 13, 2006) for the proposition that the EAB somehow "accepted" the view that the statutory maximum penalty for three sales of an unregistered and misbranded pesticide was \$16,500 [\$5,500 being the statutory maximum for a single violation in this case]. This reliance is unwarranted. Each case stands on its own facts, and it is incorrect to draw a conclusion from an issue not in dispute. In <u>FRM Chem</u>, the EPA regional office in question sought a single penalty for a sale of a pesticide that violated both FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and 12(a)(1)(E) from the outset. Thus, the EAB never addressed whether EPA may assess separate penalties for two or more

Finally, the ALJ's overly narrow reading of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) imposes an artificial ceiling on the assessment of penalties that eviscerates the wide-ranging protections afforded by that provision. FIFRA section 12(a)(1) enumerates six different prohibitions intended to protect public health and welfare from distribution or sale of certain pesticides and devices. Thus, section 12(a)(1)(A) targets unregistered pesticides to ensure that EPA can scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of pesticides before they are sold to the public. Section 12(a)(1)(B) and 12(a)(1)(C) prohibit distribution or sale of registered pesticides that make any claims different than those for which they were registered and distribution or sale of registered pesticides whose composition differs from the composition approved for registration, respectively. Section 12(a)(1)(D) and 12(a)(1)(E) address threats posed by pesticides which have not been colored as required or have labeling or packaging deficiencies, respectively.

Under the ALJ's reading of FIFRA section 12(a)(1), if a person violates any one of these provisions, he or she obtains a free pass to violate any other provision without penalty. For example, if a pesticide manufacturer sold a registered pesticide that made claims different than those accepted for registration and also contained active ingredients not approved by the registration in flagrant violation of both FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(B) and (C), it would only be penalized for one violation. With penalties thus capped, there would be less incentive for this manufacturer or any other

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violations of FIFRA section 12(a)(1) arising from the distribution or sale of the same pesticide.

registrant to adhere to all of the terms of its registration. 2 VI. CONCLUSION 3 Thus, the ALJ incorrectly concluded that EPA cannot assess 4 separate civil penalties for a violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(A) and a violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(1)(E) arising 5 6 from the same distribution or sale of a pesticide. Appellant asks 7 the Board to set aside the portions of Initial Decision that 8 pertain to this erroneous conclusion. 9 June  $\sqrt{2}$ , 2007 10 Respectfully submitted, 11 12 13 David H. Kim Assistant Regional Counsel (ORC-3) 14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 9 15 75 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 94105 16 Ph: (415) 972-3882 FAX: (415) 947-3570 17 18 Of Counsel: 19 Carl Eichenwald Gary Jonesi 20 Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 21 Washington, DC 20460-0001 22 23 24 25

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### 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I certify that the original and five copies of the foregoing 3 Brief in Support of Complainant's Notice of Appeal was hand 4 delivered to: 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Clerk of the Board, Environmental Appeals Board 6 1341 G Street, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005 7 8 and that a true and correct copy of the said document was sent by 9 First Class United States Mail, addressed to the following: 10 Spencer T. Nissen Administrative Law Judge 11 Office of Administrative Law Judges (M/C 1900L) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 12 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20460 13 14 Allen H. Smith 15 P.O. Box 5491 Peoria, AZ 85385 16 17 Regional Hearing Clerk 18 Office of Regional Counsel (ORC-1) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX 19 75 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 94105 20 21 Ву: 22 ichenwal 23 Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 24 U.S. EPA 25 26 27